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The question of the nature and scope
of philosophical discourse is one of a
contentious nature. The very direction of
the field itself is often shifted away from
its platonic roots in one of two general
directions.1 First, some postmodernist
thinkers have gone so far as to claim the
death of what people would generally
describe as academic philosophy and,
often times, of the notion of objective truth
in general. Similar to this, other thinkers
have likewise rejected past methods of
philosophy but have instead conducted
inquiries using the tools of the various
physical or psychological sciences, which
they claim have reaped more sure and
tangible progress in their particular fields.
Sciences such as psychology and semiotics
have often times been used to completely
replace the fields of epistemology and
ontology. Much of the current trend
is to declare the classical practice of
philosophy dead and obsolete because it
is thought to be intrinsically impossible,
or to simply absorb it into one of the
various other “sciences.”2 Even though
the individuals that hold these ideas arrive
at the conclusion they do, there is one
general qualm that seems to run through
the thought of both of the aforementioned
groups. This concern is the seeming
inability of philosophers throughout the
ages to come to sure conclusions regarding
given problems.3
While this objection is not entirely
without ground, it will be argued in this
paper that this is not truly an accurate
appraisal of the situation. Indeed, as many
modern thinkers have suggested, it is a case
of philosophy needing to be reformulated
into a fuller and corrected manifestation
of its original intention. I argue that the
contemporary theory of philosophy
known as phenomenology has the tools
to deal with the difficult questions of (and

1.
2.
3.
4.
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challenges to) philosophy. However, this
method of philosophy is not an entirely
new way of conducting an inquiry, but
rather presents a refined and clarified
view of the way in which philosophy was
originally formulated. As will be shown,
the methods of phenomenology are simply
ways of clarifying and augmenting the
classical contributions to philosophy while,
in addition, offering new perspectives
and insights into the age-old questions
surrounding philosophy and why these
questions are often clouded in confusion
and ambiguity. Special attention shall be
paid to the phenomenological reduction
and some of the initial findings of the
movement, as well as their implications.
Furthermore, the significance of these
findings in relation to their status as
reactions against prior movements
in philosophy will also be examined.
However, before this can be undertaken,
attention must be paid to the situation in
modern philosophy that precipitated the
need for phenomenology. In addition,
the classical conception of philosophical
realism must be briefly examined as well
to gain a full grasp of the situation.
The Classical View of Philosophy
Originally philosophy began not
strictly as the clearly-stated study of the
nature of truth, but rather as a form
of scientific cosmology that attempted
to figure out the ultimate causes that
permeated reality. Thales, one of the
progenitors of the movement toward
philosophy, with his identification of the
element of water as the basic unitary
feature of matter, was the first in a series
of Greek thinkers that sought to identify
what this unity consisted of.4 One basic
feature of all of the Greek thinkers was the
desire to come to an understanding of the
broadest principles of reality. This quest
was generally confused and convoluted as

Robert Sokolowski, Introduction to Phenomenology (New York: Cambridge, 2000), 198-202.
In this paper, the term “science” shall be broadly used to describe any organized body of knowledge.
See also: Dietrich Von Hildebrand, What is Philosophy? (Chicago: Franciscan, 1991), 1-10.
A.H. Armstrong, An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy (Totowa: Rowman & Allenheld, 1983), 1-3.

one would expect in a new field of study
that must, by practical necessity, grapple
with ways to express brand new ideas.
However, what united most of these earlier
thinkers was the underlying belief that
reality is indeed intelligible, organized,
and accessible. It must be highlighted that
the basic idea that underlies all of this
thought about the structure of the world
is the acceptance of the idea that we can
indeed know reality as it is in itself. This
idea, popularly called realism, was the
underlying thread that permeated most
philosophies up until the early modern
era in philosophy, which began in the
16th century. It seems like a simple idea,
but it is one that unites the search for all
forms of knowledge besides that of the
strictly philosophical variety. This concept
of realism is implicitly found in all of
the sciences, which seeks to discover the
nature of existent entities in so far as they
are considered biologically, physically,
etc. Indeed one could justly regard the
academic enterprise folly if our ability to
attain truth was considered impaired.
Philosophy began to be understood as
the study of truth first with Socrates, Plato
and Aristotle as a clearly demarcated field
of truth in its highest categories. A constant
theme for Plato was the nature of truth, and
in various dialogues the type of knowledge
that he considered genuinely philosophical
relates to non-contingent essences which
give existent entities their intelligibility
and being as concrete particulars. In this
way, the many facets of life can all be
considered philosophically insofar as the
essence of existent entities is the primary
focus and not their intelligibility insofar as
it relates to just any one other science (i.e.,
physics or biology).
The idea of philosophical knowledge
as the study of truth in its highest
categories could also be expressed by
Aristotle in his phrase of philosophy as
the study of “being qua being” in which
he outlines his concept of first philosophy
or metaphysics.5 By this, Aristotle was
referring to a field of study that examines
existent entities from the point of view of
their existing as things in general. This
would be opposed to an investigation

into the nature of things insofar as they
hold interest as a psychological, physical,
or neurological phenomenon. This was
indicative of the classical idea that our
ability to achieve truth is also an ability
to step back and consider the world in
its totality and not merely in reference to
limited facets of its existence. This idea
will become more important later when
considering the role of phenomenology in
restoring philosophy to its original objects
and methods of investigation.
This focusing of the object of
philosophy on the study of being also
resulted in the separating off of the other
sciences into their own fields of specificity.
As such, physics became separated from
metaphysics while fields such as neurology
became separated from the philosophy
of mind. Considering various topics
philosophically, the objects of speculation
then became more removed, in a certain
sense, from the everyday sort of scientific
investigation that a study of physics or
biology would entail. Because of this,
philosophy came to be viewed as more
of a contemplative enterprise by those in
the disciplines because its methods were
not physical methods aimed towards
certain aspects of existence, but rather
contemplative methods aimed at existence
as a whole. As far as justification of such
a philosophical knowledge was concerned,
the Greeks saw that the self-evidencing of
ultimate phenomenon was necessary, for
what other tools (such as the tools involved
in biological, physical, or economic
research) could possibly exist beyond
universal phenomenon of features to study
those features which are, by definition,
the limits or structures of knowledge and
of knowable entities?6 This concept will
come back into the philosophical picture
later with the general concern over the
nature of the justification for philosophical
knowledge.
One more fact that is worthy of note
is the emergence of the formulation of
the correspondence theory of truth, which
holds that truth value is achieved when
what is “in the mind” coordinates to what
is “out there in the world.” According to
this theory, when there is agreement (or

isomorphism) between the concept in the
mind and the object of intellection there
is truth.
Kant and the Question of Knowledge
This realist view was the general
backdrop of the philosophical enterprise
up until the early modern period when
the paradigm began to shift. Starting with
thinkers such as John Locke and Rene
Descartes and culminating with Immanuel
Kant, the ability to achieve truth and true
knowledge was systematically challenged.
There are two general lines of concern
that contribute to this shift. One reason
for this, as Immanuel Kant mentions, is
the general lack of surety or agreement
between different philosophers.7 For
example, one can point to certain
mathematical or scientific texts as definitive
in their respective fields, but we cannot do
the same with philosophy. Because of this,
there was a greater push for philosophy
to be performed using methods akin to
the precise proofs found in mathematics
and the other physical sciences. From
this general direction of concern came
the eventual limiting of philosophy by
various methods depending on the thinker.
Whether it was economics, politics, or
physics, philosophy was being constantly
limited by various other fields of study
that either intentionally or unintentionally
sought to supplant the traditional methods
of philosophy. However, the main influence
on modern concerns about the possibility
of attaining knowledge comes from the
philosophical critiques of Immanuel Kant.
One important feature of Kant’s
analysis that fueled his concerns about
how knowledge exists was his syntheticanalytic/a priori-a posteriori distinction
by which he characterized what is meant
by different types of knowledge. According
to Kant, there are statements that have
a universal quality (i.e., the a priori) and
statements that are empirical observations
of singulars (i.e., the a posteriori). In the
former (the a priori), a universal statement
or determination is made that includes all
possible entities referred to by the concept.
One example of an a priori proposition

5. Aristotle, The Metaphysics, trans. John McMahon (Amhurst: Prometheus, 1991), 66.
6. See also: Aristotle, The Metaphysics, 71-85.
7. Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics, trans. Gary Hatfield (New York: Cambridge), 5-6.
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would be “all men are rational animals.”
In this proposition, a universal statement
has been proclaimed about any currently
or possible existing man.8
This is contrasted with the a posteriori
statement in which a singular existing
entity is referred to. An example of this
style of proposition would be “this table
is square.” In this statement, the nature
of tables in general is not referred to but
rather a quality of this particular table.
These categories could also be paired
with the further categories of synthetic and
analytic statements. An analytic statement
is one in which the subject of the proposition
has included within it the predicate with
which it is adjoined. An example of an
analytic statement would be “all bachelors
are single” because within the concept
of bachelor the quality of being single is
already explicitly assumed. The other type
of statement is the synthetic statement in
which what is predicated of the subject is
something that is not explicitly contained
within the concept with which it is joined.
An example of this type of statement
would be “seven plus four equals eleven.”
In this statement, the concept of eleven
is not contained within the concepts of
four or seven; something new is being said
about the subject.
These categories of a priori/a
posteriori and synthetic-analytic yield four
combinations: analytic-a priori, analytic-a
posteriori, synthetic-a posteriori, and
synthetic-a priori. For Kant, it was this
last category that true philosophical
knowledge consists of as the synthetic-a
priori statement is universal in nature and
does not tautologically repeat whatever
concept/predicate is contained explicitly
with the subject. This was the genesis of
the main question for all philosophers
following in the footsteps of Kant: how
do we seemingly attain knowledge of
universals when we, as Hume thought
and Kant agreed, only have (in one sense)
experience of singulars?
This is where Kant’s famous
“Copernican Revolution” in philosophy
occurred. In this theory, Kant shifted the
direction of the formation of thought from
knowledge as passive receptivity to the

necessity of the objects of knowledge as
being created by the mind of the inquirer.
Presupposed in this theory was the Lockean
concept of mind as an “internal screen” of
sorts that projected to the ego the input or
data from the senses. While Locke assumed
constancy between the “external world”
and the sensations “inside” the mind, Kant
saw no reason to do so. One important
reason for this is the fact that there is no
way of investigating whether or not the
world is as it is outside of our perceptions
if our “internal” perceptions are all we can
truly know.9
Because of this, Kant shifted the
structuring element of reality from
things in themselves to the human
mind. For Kant, it was the mind that
contained within itself the structures that
made perception possible. The various
structuring categories that Aristotle listed
(quantity, quality, relation, etc.) that once
were considered properties of things
themselves were now posited as structures
in the mind. Space and time were
completely reduced to basic intuitions of
the mind. Instead of being structures that
were the order of the world, they became
mental acts/intuitions that constitute or
construct the world. Metaphysics, as the
study of being qua being was practically
reduced to studying the so-called a priori
structures of the mind (psychologism). An
unbridgeable gulf, theoretically speaking,
thus emerged between thought and world.
Because of this perceived gulf, the very
idea of the achievement of knowledge
became threatened because of the lack of
direct access to the world.
These reasons, taken together, can
be viewed as the starting point for the
disintegration of philosophical thought
into post-modernity, whether it is the postmodernity of Nietzsche and his family of
followers or the scientism of Ayer and the
other positivists. While the former of these
two groups generally related more to our
inability to achieve genuine philosophical
knowledge of reality at all, it was the
latter type that sought philosophical truth
with a scientific (the physical sciences)
methodology. It was primarily these
two groups that the phenomenological

8. See also: Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. J. Meiklejohn (Amhurst: Prometheus, 1990), 1-18.
9. Robert Sokolowski, Introduction to Phenomenology, 8-11.
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movement sought to respond to in its
restoration of philosophy.
Edmund Husserl and the Origin of
Phenomenology
Such problems formed the background
for a young German mathematicianphilosopher named Edmund Husserl
when he sought to discover the basis of
logic. Husserl wanted to find out where
the inner necessity of logical concepts
could come from and began to notice
that the then-current Kantian-influenced
strains of psychologistic philosophy could
not ultimately or even adequately explain
the necessity of such truth concepts.
For example, if the mind is that which
structures the world (and thus truth) then
how could one explain the truth value of
that statement (that the mind structures
truth) in the first place?
To accomplish his goal, Husserl
adapted the first-person introspective
experiments of Gestalt psychology. He
sought to eliminate philosophical confusion
by returning to “the things themselves,”
which he refers to as any phenomenon
insofar as it is given to experience. This
is important because, ultimately, our
knowledge of the world comes from
our experience of it, even if the idea of
experience is much broader than some
would be willing to recognize. In this sense
Husserl sought to come to a direct intuition
(intellectual apprehension) of the source of
and evidence for the concepts/problems
he was investigating. Through his method,
he wanted philosophy to receive a fresh
start.
With much hope and promise,
Husserl thought the phenomenological
movement had started to unravel the
supposed problems and pseudo-problems
of philosophy. However, the movement
quickly fractured off into various schools
such as the existentialists (e.g., Sartre,
Merleau-Ponty, and De Beauvoir), the
realists (e.g., Von Hidebrand, Scheler, and
Stein), and the hermeneutic school (e.g.,
Ricoeur, Gadamer, Heidegger). While
all of these schools have made their own
unique contributions to phenomenology,

my reading and analysis is primarily
influenced by the realist school as I
believe it most clearly exemplifies, in one
sense, a faithful continuation of Husserl’s
original vision for the phenomenological
movement.
The Phenomenological Method
However, before proceeding with
criticisms and responses to Kant and the
positivists, it would be prudent to lay out
the method that Husserl himself developed
in order to proceed with his investigations.
The method that Husserl developed was
a series of steps that carefully sought
to eliminate observer bias as much as
possible and to increase the precision and
objectivity of the reported experience.
This set of methods is also known as the
phenomenological reduction.
The first step of the method is called
the “epoche.” The epoche is a backing
away from the standard way of mental
participation in the world in which
assumptions are (as best as is possible) left
behind. This is the theoretical term that
Husserl used to describe the theoretical
openness held in contrast to the systemic
constructions of certain contemporary
analytic philosophers, as mentioned
before. It refers to a sort of temporary
suspension of belief in any feature of a
phenomenon being any more essential
that the other. In this sense, the observer
equalizes all experienced phenomena as
much as possible. Again, this is important
because of the fact that it is easy for any
observer to bring their prior assumptions
about the essences of certain phenomena
to bear on a situation or to unjustifiably
limit the scope of essential possibility from
the outset.10
An example of unintentionally bringing bias into an analysis would be if
two individuals were analyzing a wire
pyramid (one of the individuals being an
ancient Egyptian who knew nothing of
geometry, and the other being an ancient
Greek geometrician who knew nothing of
Egyptian pyramids) and a third individual
asked them to describe the pyramid. The

observers would likely answer differently.
While the former observer would
undoubtedly bring religious beliefs about
pyramids to bear on the analysis of the
phenomenon, the geometrician would
probably consider it as a teaching tool with
his background as a mathematician. The
problem is that both of these individuals
have, in a way, already decided from the
outset the essence of the wire pyramid
because of the system of beliefs that
they brought to bear in analyzing the
phenomenon. The basic function behind
the epoche could basically be described
as performing the task of keeping the
phenomenological observer’s mind open
so as not to exclude any phenomenon,
possible data, or aspects of reality.
Related to this is the idea that
phenomenological observers must, in light
of this openness, describe what they are
seeing to the best of their ability and not
simply state what the phenomenon is right
from the start: To state definitively what
its essence is violates the principle of the
epoche and the openness to evidence that
it is supposed to engender. For example,
if one were asked to give the essence of
the color black, they would probably get
a variety of responses from the observers.
These answers would probably include
black as either a color or the absence of
color. However, if one were to point at a
black object and describe it, they would
probably respond simply, “black.” In this
way the difference between describing and
defining can be seen as vital to the possible
richness of things themselves.11
The next step of the phenomenological reduction is related to the first:
the phenomenon must be apodictic
in its appearance. In other words,
the phenomenon must be certain in
appearance, even though the observer
might not be certain as to what is exactly
appearing before him. For example, if one
were to observe and describe a coat and
hat on a rack at the end of a dim hallway,
he must only describe the phenomenon
as it certainly appears to him; namely, as
a phenomenon that presents itself in the
appearance of either a person cowering in

the hallway or as simply a hat and coat on a
rack. This openness is important because,
in a way, all of these features belong to the
essence of the phenomenon. However, it
is important to note that this reduction is
simply a tool that will assist in maximizing
the observed richness of the phenomenon
and that assessing which aspects of the
phenomenon are most essential will come
much later in the process.
The feature of the process that
follows the initial reduction is known as
the phenomenological variation. In this
method, as many different variations
as are practical are performed on the
phenomenon. Throughout this search for
variations, invariants are looked for that
governs the perceptions of the observer.
It is through this analysis of invariants
that a sense of finality is achieved
although for some phenomenon it is only
a relative finality. Through this method
several regularities and formal structures
were indeed discovered by Husserl.
However, before going into some of the
particular findings of phenomenology, an
examination of the theoretical attitude
implied by this method of openness should
be laid out in order to clearly realize its
implications for philosophy.13
The Phenomenological Attitude and
the Domain of Evidence
As implied by its name, phenomenology is, tautologically, the study of
phenomenon. In Husserl’s view, this means
literally any phenomenon insofar as it is
given in perception. Any phenomenon
such as religious experience, logic, or
emotions may be evidence insofar as it is
directly intuited (beheld or apprehended)
by the one investigating. This feature is
highly and purposely emphasized in order
to keep a genuine openness so as not to
exclude any possible data which could
reveal something about reality. It is an
openness akin to the ancient view of our
ability to step back and look at the world
in its totality.
In this way, phenomenology could
be described as a radical empiricism, in

10. See also: Don Ihde, Experimental Phenomenology: An Introduction, (Albany: SUNY, 1986) 32.
11. Don Ihde, Experimental Phenomenology: An Introduction, 34.
12. Don Ihde, Experimental Phenomenology: An Introduction, 33.
13. See also: Robert Sokolowski, Introduction to Phenomenology, 179-180.
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the sense that the definition of what is
considered to be valid empirical evidence
is not arbitrarily limited as it is in some
systems of philosophical thought (such as
that of the positivists). In logical positivism,
as exemplified by A.J. Ayer, a statement
can only be meaningful if it is either
(1) empirically verifiable or (2) a logical
tautology (analytic a priori statement);
that is, a statement where the predicate
is contained within the subject (i.e., All
bachelors are unmarried: the concept of
bachelor already references the state of not
being married).14

contain within itself reference to its own
negation (to what it is not). This statement
conditions all of our thinking about any
possible conditions of reality. Because of
this, the aforementioned proposition, while
existing as a material element of existence,
must also subsist as a formal element that
reaches out to all real and possible beings.15
This is important to note as this is a basic
axiom to be accepted and intuited if the life
of reason is to be entered at all. To enter
into any rational discussion or discourse is
to implicitly assume the universal validity
of the principle of non-contradiction.

The point made against this notion
by phenomenologists is that the largely
physical-centered criteria of empirical
evidence that the positivist uses implicitly
assumes that the only kind of verifiable
existence is of the physical. The
phenomenological criticism of this first
point is important because it reveals the
generally arbitrary and non-necessary
character of the positivist notion of the
empirical. By outlining what the domain
of suitable or valid evidence is, the
positivist assumes the very point that they
are attempting to prove when they attack
metaphysical notions.

The basic character of
the
phenomenological objections could be
phrased as follows: why should topics such
as metaphysics or ethics be considered any
less real because they are not able to be
verified in the way that a physical object can
be by an “objective” party of observers?
While it is, admittedly, difficult to verify
logical and metaphysical phenomenon, it
only can be prejudicial towards the search
for truth if all possible evidence is not taken
into consideration. This inquiry becomes
truly philosophical when the categories
of acceptable evidence are broadened
to include anything that appears to the
observer. This is the attitude that early
thinkers had when they viewed philosophy
as a stepping back from the world to be
able to view it in its totality. As shown in the
next section, the findings of this method
and attitude have cleared away much of
the ambiguity that surrounded much of
the critical problem in modern philosophy.

One other example that would
be helpful in illustrating the positivist
assumption is an analysis of the
foundational character of the logic that
positivists assume in any analysis that they
give (in particular the principle of noncontradiction: that something cannot be
true and non-true in the same sense and
at the same time). According to their own
principles of “empirical observation”
positivists would be wholly unable to
ground the very logic they depend on for
their system of thought because logical
“entities” cannot be analyzed in the way
that contingent physical features can be
analyzed.
One further point that follows from
this in regard to the second criteria of
positivism is the fact that the principle
of non-contradiction is not itself an
analytical statement: it is synthetic. In the
statement that “(A) cannot be (non-A),” the
concept of any being does not explicitly

Some Specific Findings: Objections,
Responses, and Implications
The plan for this philosophical method
was simple: with the phenomenological
reduction in play, the phenomenologist
was to seek out the invariant features
in experience (i.e., essences) that
characterized it or appeared in it. When
this was done, one phenomenon quickly
started to re-occur as basic: intentionality.
By this term, Husserl referred to the idea
that all of our thoughts or perceptions
were about something. Husserl acquired

14. A.J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic (New York: Dover, 1952) 5.
15. Dietrich Von Hildebrand, What is Philosophy? 84-85.
16. See also: Robert Sokolowski, Introduction to Phenomenology, 8-16.
17. See also: Don Ihde, Experimental Phenomenology: An Introduction, 43-50.
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this idea of intentionality from his teacher
Franz Brentano, who in turn acquired this
notion from the tradition of Aristotle and
his medieval followers. This idea states that
all of our experiences (thinking, willing,
etc.) are always about something.16
With this, Husserl noted that there
is a basic shape to experience: the object
perceived and the accompanying act
of perception which invariably and
necessarily accompanies the object. He
termed the object of perception the
“noema” or “noematic object,” and he
termed the mental act of disclosure the
“noesis” or “noetic act.” In this basic
structure of intentional consciousness, the
self or ego is only implicitly assumed as the
bearer of experience and is not a direct
object of “introspection.”17
Superficially, this observation of
intentionality perhaps seems rather
dull and unnecessary until one begins
to unpack all of what is implied by this
statement. According to Locke and
Kant, what we are directly aware of is
an image in our consciousness. However,
if one were to thoroughly analyze his
or her experiences of phenomenon, an
experience of pure consciousness would
nowhere be encountered, but only the
things themselves. Because of this, the
theoretical doorway from our minds
to the world is demolished; the bridge
between mind and world is revealed as a
pseudo-problem. Knowledge is once more
theoretically viable because of the bridging
of mind and world.
Another piece of evidence against
Kant would be the phenomenological
experience of the logically objective nature
of Kant’s claims. For example, if the limits
for truth are the a priori structures of the
mind, then there is no way Kant could
objectively make that claim, for then the
logic that he uses would be above and prior
to his mind, ontologically speaking. Again,
if all that can be (in terms of knowledge) is
what the mind forms, then describing the
nature of the mind would be impossible
to objectively do. This phenomenon of
experienced truth in that case does not at
all match up with what Kant has said about

the nature of how the mind conditions
truth. In this aspect, Kant’s theory does
not match up with what presents itself to
the mind of the honest phenomenological
observer. In this way, knowledge is observed
to be a passive receptivity in which we
receive knowledge in accordance with our
attentiveness to the phenomenon.18
However, while the aforementioned
evidential phenomenon supports the
phenomenological position, there are some
phenomenon that support other theories
of the mind. One example that could
imply a Kantian model of the mind would
be hallucinations. The question could be
posed as such: if we truly experience the
world as it is, then how does one explain
the nature of hallucinations (which are
implicitly assumed as not truly of the
world). However, there are equally suitable
explanations for hallucinations that lend
themselves just as much, logically speaking,
to a direct realist model of consciousness
(wherein we directly behold the world as it
is) as postulated by ancient and medieval
philosophers. As such, there is not truly as
much reason to consider mind as separate
from the world, especially if our conscious
experiences of the world are inseparably
and intentionally related to it.
The objection could still be made
against phenomenology that one cannot
see and verify the universals that we use
in logic and as such must exclude them.
However, this line of objection exemplifies
the type of automatic exclusion that the
openness of the epoche was designed to
create. Because we experience universals
or logical principles as somehow or
another “in the world,” then philosophical
patience, attentiveness, and diligence
become required to delve into their secrets,
rather than an automatic exclusion of
relevant information that could provide
genuine insight into the true nature of
things just because they do not fit into a preconstructed paradigm. Truth is something
that gains its meaning from the fact that
it is not all revealable at the same time.
There is often the implicit assumption that
whatever is knowable must be something
which is accessible to everybody at every
time, which is not necessarily the case.

Another line of objection concerns
the justification of beliefs about the
nature of the mind and world. How
can one justify the basic principles of
experience, phenomenologically speaking,
with something beyond the experience of
reality if one is not to head into an infinite
regress? There often seems to be theoretical
grounds for doubting our perceptions (in
the manner of Descartes even).

meant as a new way of doing philosophy
but rather as a much clearer expression
and development of what it was originally
intended to be.

One answer would be that, as the
ancients thought, there must be something
self-justifying about our experience of
things in the world. It would also be
accurate to state that the kind of surety
that such objectors require is not even
possible, in principle, because of the
fact that truth or its justification is not
something that can be taken by force or
possessed as a mere object in the world.
In addition, the discovery of deception
implies that a certain truth relating to the
actual state of affairs has been intuited.
The apprehension of entities comes prior
to any other intellectual stance that one
can take toward them. In this way it can be
seen how any organized attempt to doubt
apprehension is futile, as any attempt to
doubt an object pre-supposes its prior
existence.
Phenomenology as the Continuation
of the Classical Notion of Philosophy
Throughout
all
of
the
phenomenological objections put forward
against some modern philosophies, one
general trend exists: namely, the idea
that the ability to participate in the world
is knowledge. To even begin rational
discussion, our ability to achieve truth
is implicitly assumed. Because of these
ideas and findings of phenomenology,
the debris caused by several centuries of
philosophical rubble is cleared in order to
let philosophy flourish as it was originally
formulated. This is not to say that the
movement has generated solutions to
all of the philosophical problems out
there; there is much yet to be solved.
I believe that it is only the case that
phenomenology has cleared a pathway for
future contributions to the field. Again, the
tools of phenomenology are not strictly

18. Dietrich Von Hildebrand, What is Philosophy? 13-25.
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